Effects of policy instruments on farm investments and production decisions in the Spanish cop sector by Kallas, Zein et al.
1 
 
Effects of policy instruments on farm investments and 
production decisions in the Spanish cop sector 
Zein Kallas
1, Teresa Serra
1 and José M. Gil
1 
1Centre de Recerca en Economia i Desenvolupament Agroalimentaris, (CREDA)-UPC-IRTA, Parc Mediterrani de la 











Paper prepared for presentation at the  113
th EAAE Seminar “A resilient European food 
industry and food chain in a challenging world”, Chania, Crete, Greece, date as in: September 
3 - 6, 2009 
 
Copyright 2009 by [Zein Kallas
1, Teresa Serra
1 and José M. Gil
1].  All rights reserved.  
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by 




Effects of policy instruments on farm investments and 
production decisions in the Spanish cop sector 
Zein Kallas
1, Teresa Serra
1 and José M. Gil
1 
1Centre de Recerca en Economia i Desenvolupament Agroalimentaris, (CREDA)-UPC-IRTA, Parc Mediterrani de la 
Tecnologia, Barcelona, Spain. 
Abstract Our paper asses the impacts of the partially decoupled (PD) scheme, implemented during the 1990s and 
first half of the 2000s in the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), on on-farm investment as well as 
on other production decisions. The Spanish COP sector was taken as a case study due to its economic and political 
relevance. The empirical analysis is applied on farm-level data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), 
observed from 2000 to 2004, based on. We use a reduced-form application of the dual model of investment under 
uncertainty and a system of censored and non censored equations is estimated. PD payments are found to increase 
short-run production and to generate a statically significant increase in the investment in farm assets. Results also 
show the importance of assessing the effects of PD payments in a dynamic framework as the one applied in this 
paper. 
Keywords: farm investments, Common Agricultural Policy, decoupling, production. 
1. Introduction and Objectives 
Farm household assets can be classified into two main different types; off-farm and on-farm investments. 
The former are not directly related to farming activities and are based on non-farming assets such as 
financial assets. These investments are generally used by farmers to effectively stabilize the financial 
performance of their farm income and to reduce risk in their economic results. On the other hand, on-farm 
investments are directed toward farming activities to improve or support agricultural practices and to 
ensure a regular flow of goods and services. In this regard, on-farm investments involve assets such as 
farm machinery, farm buildings, land improvements and other farming assets. 
Farmer behaviour towards investment and production decisions has been the focus of numerous studies. 
While Mishra and Morehart (2001), Gustafson and Chama (1994) and Serra et al. (2004), among others, 
have assessed non-farm investment decisions, on-farm investments have received even more attention in 
the literature. Oude Lansink et al. (2001) analyse the factors that determine farmer investment in energy-
saving  systems.  Carey  and  Zilberman  (2002)  analyze  investments  in  modern  irrigation  systems  and 
technologies. Baer and Brown (2006) assess the investments in internet technology to improve farming 
business  results.  Wabi  et  al.  (2006)  analyze  the  investment  in  integrated  pest  management  systems. 
Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) carry out a literature review to identify the variables that are significant in 
explaining farmers’ adoption of innovations and investment. 
Findings from previous research allow us to classify variables that usually influence farmers’ investment 
decisions into non-economic and economic factors. The former factors are represented by a) Farmer 
characteristics,  such  as  age,  gender,  education,  social  status,  farming  experience  or  knowledge;  b) 
Farmer attitudes and opinions like risk aversion, membership in organizations, political opinion, source 
of information or environmental preferences; and c) Agronomic characteristics, such as soil fertility and 
degree of erosion, or animal welfare. The economic factors include a) farm management issues including 
input  use  intensity,  family  and  hired  labour,  farm  size,  production  costs,  crop  diversity,  gross  farm 
income,  off-farm  activities,  debt  level,  access  to  credit,  extension  and  technical  assistance,  farm 
productivity and efficiency; and b) Exogenous factors like the market size, policy support, input and 
output prices, interest rate and price variation.  
Among  the  economic  factors,  agricultural  policy  support  has  been  shown  to  play  a  relevant  role  in 
investment decisions (Sckokai, 2005; Coyle, 2005 and Cahill, 2005). This is particularly relevant in the 
cereal, oilseed and protein (COP) crops sector, which has received considerable attention within the EU 
agricultural policy. Over the last years, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) applied to the COP sector 
has undergone an important reform process characterized by a reduction in price supports. Direct income 3 
 
supports were introduced to compensate farmers for their reduced income due to reduced prices. These 
supports were defined as area payments on the basis of historical average yields and arable crops area. 
Several authors (see, e.g., Moro and Sckokai, 1999; Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996 and Serra et al., 
2005a) have concluded that these payments are only partially decoupled (PD) since they contain some 
elements of support still tied to farmers’ production decisions. The CAP reform process culminated with 
the 2003 reform that introduced the single farm payment, defined as a fully decoupled measure (FD) since 
payments were not theoretically related to production decisions. 
This  paper  focuses  on  analysing  the  impact  of  agricultural  policy  support  on  on-farm  investment 
decisions in the Spanish COP sector. Farm-level data observed from 2000 to 2004, based on the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) are used in the empirical application. The statistical data to analyze 
the effects of FD payments are not yet available, since these payments were first applied in the 2006-2007 
marketing year, we thus will focus on the PD payments. Previous research assessing the impacts of CAP 
PD payments has mainly focused on variable input use and land allocation (Balkhausen et al., 2008; 
Hennessy and Rehman, 2008; Serra et al., 2005b; Ridier and Jacquet, 2002; Moro and Sckokai, 1999; 
Guyomard et al., 1996; or Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996). Although, to date, only a few unpublished 
studies have analysed the impacts of the PD support scheme on investment decisions in the EU context 
(Sckokai, 2005), this is the first attempt to analyse this issue specifically for Spain.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides more details on the COP sector 
and the CAP support received by this sector. The next two sections introduce the econometric framework 
and the empirical implementation. In Section 5 the results are discussed. Finally, some conclusions are 
outlined. 
2. The COP sector and the CAP Reforms 
The EU-27 is the third world’s largest producer of cereals with 12.12% of global production, behind the 
USA (15.60%) and China (20.05%), and is the first worldwide producer of barley (40.5%) and wheat 
(20.8%) (FAOSTAT, 2007). The EU-27 COP sector represents 76.5% of total utilized agricultural area 
(UAA)  and  37.2%  of  total  crop  production  (FAOSTAT,  2007).  In  2006,  the  most  important  cereal 
producers within the EU-27 were France and Germany, representing 23.27% and 14.76% of total EU 
production, respectively, followed by Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. The Spanish COP 
sector occupies 59.0% of the Spanish UAA and represents 30.2% of the Spanish total crop production. As 
can be seen in Table 1, during the period of analysis (2000-2004) cereals represent the most important 
crop within the Spanish COP sector, followed by protein and oilseed crops. Moreover, the Spanish COP 
sector represents 10.1% of the total European (EU-27) COP UAA and 6.83% of the total European COP 
production. 
Table 1: The COP area and production in Spain within the period study 























































a Percentage over total COP area 
b Percentage over total COP production 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the COP sector has received a lot of political attention in Europe, being 
one of the most relevant sectors within the CAP. Of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 4 
 
Fund (EAGGF) expenditure, 25.1% is devoted to COP. (MAPA, 2006). Furthermore, it was one of the 
axes of the CAP reform process (Serra et al., 2005a). The 1992 reform was mainly focused on the COP 
sector and was characterized by a substantial reduction in guaranteed prices. Oilseed and protein crop 
guaranteed prices were abolished, while cereal prices were reduced by one third. In order to compensate 
farmers’ income decline, an area payment defined on the basis of historical regional average yields and 
arable  crop  areas  was  introduced.  Moreover,  professional  producers  were  required  to  set  aside  a 
percentage of their cultivated area in exchange for set aside premium. 
The so called Agenda 2000 continued to further decouple support received by farmers. The guaranteed 
price for cereals was reduced by 15% and the direct payment increased by the same proportion (Table 2). 
Direct payments to oilseed crops were reduced to the cereals’ payment level. Direct payments to protein 
crops  were  also  reduced  but  kept  above  the  cereal  and  oilseed  payments,  to  ensure  the  relative 
profitability of protein crops. It is worth mentioning that the novelty of this reform is defined by the 
support for the rural economy as a whole and the overall contribution of farmers to society, rather than 
supporting them for what they produce. In 2003, another substantial reform (Mid Term Review) was 
approved aiming at increasing farmers’ efficiency, reducing the negative environmental externalities of 
agriculture, and maintaining farm income without distorting farm production decisions. The single farm 
payment was introduced as a key element in the new farm support system. This latter reform started to 
operate in the 2006-2007 season. Due to the lack of data to analyse the latter reform, our study focuses on 
the consequences of the Agenda 2000 on on-farm investments. Results provide guidance regarding the 
expected consequences of the latter reform. 
Table 2: Expenditure and change in the support to the COP sector after Agenda 2000 Reform 
  1999  2000  2001  2004 
Cereals 
Intervention price (€/t)  119.19  110.25  101.31  101.31 
Direct Payment (€/t)  54.34  58.67  63.00  63.00 
Oilseeds  Direct payment (€/t/cereal equivalent)  94.24  81.74  72.37  63.00 
Protein crops  Direct payment (€/t/cereal equivalent)  78.49  72.50  72.50  72.50 
Set aside          Direct payment in (€/t)  68.83  58.67  63.00  63.00 
Expenditure in 
















*% of the Total Common Organization of the Market (C.O.M.) expenses by the European Agricultural Guarantee 
Fund transferred to the COP sector. 
3. The theoretical and econometric frameworks 
Our empirical analysis is based on a reduced-form application of the dual model of investment under 
uncertainty developed by Sckokai (2005). The conceptual foundations of this model rely on the duality 
theory results from McLaren and Cooper (1980) and Epstein (1981). Under the assumptions that farmers 
produce a single output, are not risk neutral and take their decisions to maximize discounted utility over 
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(1 ) k k h = -                   (1) 
where function  u is the expected utility of wealth which is assumed to depend on the expected farm’s 
wealth ( A); the variance of wealth (
2
A s ), which can originate from uncertainties in production and/or 
market prices. k
×
 is the time derivative of the capital path, h  represents the capital depreciation rate and 
k are the units of capital. The expected farm’s wealth is given by:  0 r A A py wx ck S S = + - - + + , 
where  0 A is  a  farm’s  initial  wealth;  p is  the  expected  market  output  price;  y   is  the  farm  output 
production function;  w  is the known variable input price;  x  is the quantity used of a variable input; c 
is the capital rental price, also assumed to be known; S includes the CAP direct payments to COP crops; 
and  r S  is the rural development subsidies. The farm’s single output production function is represented as 
( , , ; ) y f x k I b e = + , where  I  is the gross investment in capital and b is labor which is considered a 
fixed input  
The  Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman  dynamic  programming  equation  corresponding  to  the  optimization 
problem is:  { }
, , max ( ) k I x y rJ u J I K h = + -  where the subscript denotes a derivative and r  is the interest 
rate. The first derivatives of this expression with respect to output and input prices yield the optimal 
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Since not every farm invests in every asset nor produces each crop considered, a censoring issue underlies 
the empirical model. To handle this issue, we use the Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) estimation procedure 
that is described below. Let  , 1,..., i F i n = , represent a censored decision variable,  , 1,..., j H j n m = +  
a  non-censored  one,  and 
2
0 ( , , , , , , , , , ) r A r A P w c b S S k s X =   the  vector  of  explanatory  variables. 
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(3) 
where  F  and  H are vectors containing the censored and non-censored variables respectively,  b b b b and 
g g g g are vectors of parameters and t denotes each observation. In order to estimate (3) we follow the two-
step procedure outlined by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999).  
In  the  first  step,  the  discrete  variable  indicating  a  non-censored  observation  of  ( 0) t t d = > F F is 
evaluated through a probit model of the form: 
( , ) t t g = d Z a a a a                     (4) 6 
 
where  t Z  represents a vector of exogenous variables that can or cannot coincide with  t X  and  a a a a is a 
vector of parameters. In the second step, the normal cumulative distribution function  ( , ) t F Z a a a a  and the 
normal  probability  density  function  ( , ) t f Z a a a a   derived  from  the  probit  model  are  used  to  construct 
correction terms in the censored equations in system (3). Thus, the resulting system can be rewritten as: 
F
H
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )




f  = F + + 
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= +  
F Z X Z
H X
a b d a x a b d a x a b d a x a b d a x
g x g x g x g x             (5)
 
where d d d d  is a vector of coefficients and 
F
t x x x x  and 
H
t x x x x  are vectors of error terms. Assuming a linear system 
of censored and non-censored equations, the system in (5) can be expressed as: 
F
H
( ) ( )
( )
t t t t t
t t t
f  = F + + 

= +  
F Z' X' Z'
H X'
a b d a x a b d a x a b d a x a b d a x
g x g x g x g x               (6)
 
which is estimated by the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Procedure.  
Following Su and Yen (2000), it should be noted that parameter estimates derived from the Shonkwiler 
and Yen two-step method might disguise the actual effects of the explanatory variables. This would be 
especially  true  when  a  common  explanatory  variable  is  used  in  the  first  and  second  stages  of  the 
estimation process. This common variable affects the dependent variable through the index  t X'b b b b , as well 
as through the normal cumulative distribution function  ( ) t F Z' a a a a  and the normal probability density 
function  ( ) t f Z' a a a a derived  from  the  probit  model.  In  order  to  solve  this  problem,  we  compute  the 
marginal effects and rely on them for the interpretation of results. Marginal effects are derived using the 
Su and Yen (2000) formulation and evaluated at data means: 
,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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where subindex z represents the explanatory variable whose marginal effect is being computed. 
As  Shonkwiler  and  Yen  (1999)  note,  the  error  term  derived  from  the  second  step  of  the  method  is 
heteroscedastic.  In  light  of  this  problem,  we  use  Monte  Carlo  bootstrapping  procedures  to  derive 
consistent variance-covariance estimates for the parameters of the model
1. 
4. Empirical implementation 
Farm-level data for a sample of Spanish farms specialized in the production of COP crops are utilized. 
Data are taken from the Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) for the period 2000-2004, a period 
during which the Agenda 2000 reforms were effective. The FADN data set is a harmonized source of 
information for European production that includes technical, financial and economic data on farming. 
Though  our  analysis  is  based  on  farm-level  data,  aggregate  statistics  are  also  used  to  define  some 
variables not included in FADN. Country-level nominal market inflation rates and interest rates have been 
taken from the official statistics published by EUROSTAT (2007) and OECD (2007), respectively. 
                                                 
1 1,000 pseudo-samples of the same size as the actual sample, drawn with replacement, to provide a sample of 
parameter  estimates  from  which  we  estimate  the  parameter  covariance  matrix.  For  each pseudo-sample  of  data, 
Shonkwiler and Yen’s two-step method is applied to estimate the parameters of the model. The covariance matrices 
are derived from the distribution of the replicated estimates generated in the bootstrap process. The standard errors of 
the marginal effects are also derived using the replicated marginal effect estimates from the bootstrapped samples. 7 
 
In our empirical application, the model presented in (2) is generalized to consider a multi-output firm, as 
well as the investment in different types of assets. We distinguish between two output types: 1) cereals 
and 2) oilseeds and protein crops. As explained, the regulation of these crops is very similar. However, 
while cereals continue to have an intervention price, oilseed and protein crops do  not.  Additionally, 
cereals represent the main crop for the farms in our sample (see Table 3). The two-output specification is 
also motivated by this fact: we observe cereals as one single entity instead of aggregating them into a 
wider group in light of their importance. 
Five dependent variables are defined. First, we define two quasi-fixed inputs ( 1 k  and  2 k ). While  1 k  
represents the gross farm investment in machinery and equipment,  2 k  aggregates the gross investment in 
farm buildings and land improvements
2. Assuming constant returns to scale, output can be approximated 
by land. Thus, the third and fourth decision variables represent land allocated to cereals ( 1 y ) and to 
oilseed and protein crops ( 2 y ), respectively
3. The last decision variable represents variable input costs 
(x). This variable includes crop-specific variable inputs such as seeds and seedlings, fertilizers, crop 
protection products and other specific crop costs
4. 
Following  the  theoretical  framework  presented  above,  a  set  of  explanatory  variables  is  defined.  The 
holding’s lagged agricultural area is used as an indicator of a farms’ wealth ( 0 A ). Expected output prices 
( p ) are defined for cereals ( 1 p ) and oilseed and protein crops ( 2 p ) and computed at the farm-level as 
the ratio of farm sales in currency units to farm output in physical units. Variable input prices (w ) are 
approximated  through  the  lagged  price  index  for  plant  protection  products  and  pesticides  ( 1 w )  and 
fertilizers  and  soil  improvers  ( 2 w ).  The  rental  price  for  capital  (c )  is  defined  for  both  types  of 
investment considered: for machinery and equipment ( 1 c ) and for farm building and land improvement 
( 2 c ). For each group, the capital rental price is calculated as  ( )   12 i i i c r z , i , h = + = , where  r  is the 
annual market interest rate,  i h  is the capital depreciation rate which is computed at the data means and at 
the farm level, and  i z  is the capital price index. To avoid multicolinearity issues, the interest rate is not 
included again as a single explanatory variable. Total labor of the holding (b ) is expressed in annual 
working units and includes both family and rented labor. Variable S  includes CAP subsidies received by 
COP  producers,  while  rural  development  subsidies,  i.e.,  the  environmental  and  less  favoured  area 
payments, are included in  r S . A farm’s wealth variability 
2
A s  is approximated by the coefficient of 
variation of lagged COP sales on a per hectare basis. This measure was calculated at the farm level for the 
five years considered in this study. To avoid endogeneity issues,  k  is approximated by the lagged value 
of machinery and equipment ( 1, 1 k - ) and of building and land improvement ( 2, 1 k - ).  
Other explanatory variables not included in the theoretical framework, but shown by previous research to 
be relevant when explaining production decisions are also considered. These variables include the age of 
the manager (g) of the holding and the proportion of rented land over total land (PR ). Since farmers 
tend to be risk averse (Chavas and Pope, 1985, Hansen and Singleton 1983 and Serra et al., 2004), 
producers’ risk preferences may play an important role in their decisions. Farmers’ risk attitudes can be 
captured using a dummy variable ( ins D ) that takes the value 1 if the farm insures its crops and zero, 
otherwise (Serra, et al., 2004 and, Goodwin and Mishra, 2006). Moreover, thirteen dummy variables, 
which represent the Spanish Autonomous Communities ( j m ), are included in the empirical specification 
                                                 
2 Almost 90% of our farms do not invest in machinery and equipment, while more than 95% have zero investment in 
farm buildings and land improvements. As a result, both variables are considered as censored. 
3 Almost 64% of the farms did not plant oilseed or protein crops. Therefore this variable was considered as censored. 
Conversely, less than 1% of the farms did not plant cereals and thus the variable was not considered a censored one.  
4 This variable was treated as non-censored since only a 0.04% of observations are null. 8 
 
to  account  for  differences  between  different  Spanish  regions.  Summary  statistics  of  the  explanatory 
variables are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Variable summary statistics 
Variable name  Measurement 
Unit*  Mean  Std. deviation 
0 A   Total Agricultural Area of holding (UAA).  ha  101.503  133.88 
1 k   Gross investment of machinery and equipment.  € 100   0.172  0.875 
2 k   Gross investment of farm building and Land improvement.  € 100  0.064  0.665 
1 y   Cultivated area of cereals crops.  ha  69.557  96.041 
2 y   Cultivated area of protein and oilseeds crops.  ha  6.128  20.546 
x  Total specific cost.  € 100  121.240  171.347 
1 p   Expected oilseed and protein crop price.  €  110.547  29.218 
2 p   Expected cereal price.  €  119.411  21.430 
1 w   Lagged input price index for plant protection products and 
pesticides.  -  1.031  0.022 
2 w   Lagged input price index for fertilizers and soil improvers.  -  1.019  0.065 
1 c   Rental price of Machinery and equipment  -  6.979  2.632 
2 c   Rental price of Building and land improvement.  -  5.597  0.509 
b   Total labor input of holding.  number  1.206  1.071 
S  Area payments and set aside premiums.  €  16,113.290  20,827.59 
r S   Subsidies for environmental and rural development.  €  425.266  1,560.85 
2
A s   Coefficient of variation of lagged sales by hectares.  -  49.161  432.834 
1, 1 k -   Lagged machinery and equipment capital.  €  17,685.72  27,312.72 
2, 1 k -   Lagged Building and land improvement capital.  €  17,230.45  25,648.55 
g  Regular unpaid holding manger age.  year  50.727  12.21 
PR   Proportion of rented UAA from the total UAA.  -  0.361  0.428 
ins D   Dummy variable: 1 for insurance cost, 0 otherwise.  -  0.9024  0.2967 
* All the monetary values were expressed in constant currency units. 9 
 
5. Results 
Parameter estimates of the SUR model and the marginal effects are presented in Table 4. As mentioned, 
in those cases where the decision variables are censored (machinery, building and land improvement 
investments, and oilseeds and protein crops area), we rely on marginal effects for the interpretation of our 
results,  because  parameter  estimates  derived  from  Shonkwiler  and  Yen  two-step  method  might  be 
masking the actual effects of the explanatory variables. 
As shown by previous research (Sckokai, 2005), government payments can impact production decisions 
through different mechanisms. First, they can influence production decisions by altering relative market 
prices. Second, they can also alter farmers’ risk preferences by altering price or revenue uncertainty and 
exogenous income. As has been shown by previous research (Sandmo, 1971; Chavas and Pope 1985; 
Hennesy, 1998 and Serra, et al., 2006), a change in risk preferences are likely to have an effect on 
production  decisions.  Finally,  government  payments  can  have  dynamic  effects  on  production  by 
stimulating changes in investment demand (Sckokai, 2005 and Coyle, 2005).  
Subsidy parameter estimates suggest that an increase in PD payments (S) increases the investment in 
building and land improvement ( 1 k ). In addition, both PD payments and rural development subsidies 
( r S ), have a positive  impact on  machinery and equipment  investment ( 2 k ). Since  farm output is a 
function  of  different  inputs  including  the  level  of  capital,  which  depends  on  past  decisions  on 
investments,  the  impact  of  CAP  subsidies  on  investment  demand  will  have  long-lasting  (dynamic) 
impacts on production. 
PD payments further stimulate production by motivating an increase in the use of variable inputs. These 
results are consistent with those obtained by Serra et al. (2005a) who found area payments in the COP 
sector to motivate an increase in the use of crop protection products, thus suggesting that they are not 
fully decoupled. Finally PD payments are found to influence land allocation by stimulating an increase in 
the area devoted to cereals, the predominant crop within the Spanish COP sector.  
The initial wealth coefficient estimate demonstrate that an increase in farm’s wealth causes an increase in 
the area devoted to cereal crops as well as an increase in variable input use. The relevance of wealth in 
explaining production decisions is compatible with the relevance of risk attitudes in explaining production 
behavior. It is widely accepted that an economic agent’s degree of risk aversion decreases with wealth 
(Sandmo, 1971; Hennessy, 1998). Hence, wealthier farmers, in being less risk averse, are likely to be 
more prone to expand their business size. These results together with the subsidy parameter estimates 
suggest  that  agricultural  subsidies  can  have  relevant  wealth  effects.  Because  government  payments 
contribute to enhanced wealth, they lead to increasing output supply and input demand. 
Serra et al. (2005b), suggested that direct costs of land rentals may create stronger incentives to work the 
land  more intensively, relative to the opportunity costs  borne by owned fields. Compatible  with this 
hypothesis, our results show that those farms with a higher proportion of rented area (PR ) are more 
prone to invest in machinery and use more variable inputs. They are also more likely to devote more land 
to grow cereals to the detriment of land allocated to oilseed and protein crops.  
Farmer’s age is an indicator of farmer’s experience. Results demonstrate that an increase in the age (g) 
of the holding manager leads to an increase in investment demand. These results suggest that the more 
experienced the farmers are, the more likely they are to invest. It is also true that older farmers are less 
likely to be credit constrained relative to their younger counterparts, which facilitates investment. 
Farmers who have signed up for an insurance contract ( ins D ) tend to invest more and use more variable 
inputs than farmers who do not insure. To the extent that farmers are not risk neutral, insurance will 
reduce  their  aversion  to  risk  and  stimulate  production.  Compatible  with  these  results,  the  parameter 
estimate representing risk (i.e., the coefficient of variation of lagged sales per hectare- 
2
A s ) suggests that 
an increase in risk levels is accompanied by a decrease in both types of investments. Moreover, farmers 
also try to minimize variable input use when uncertainty increases. 10 
 
While rental prices for machinery ( 1 c ) and building and land improvements ( 2 c ) are not significant in 
explaining investment decisions, other market prices such as oilseed and protein crop prices ( 1 p ) and the 
input index for plant protection products and pesticides ( 1 w ) are statistically significant. An increase in 
1 w  yields a decrease in both investment and the demand for variable inputs. An increase in  1 p
 
is found 
to motivate investment in buildings and land improvements. 
As expected, results suggest that a decrease in the expected price of protein and oilseed crops ( 1 p ) yields 
a decrease in their cultivated area in favor of cereals. Conversely, a decrease in the expected price of 
cereal ( 2 p ) is found to increase the area allocated to cereals. Since cereals are the main crop within the 
sector, a price decline causes a substantial reduction in the farmer’s income. To compensate for this 
decline, farmers increase the quantity produced of this crop to maintain income. It is worthwhile to note 
that average cereal prices are higher than the alternative crop prices (Table 4). As a result, to the extent 
that the cereal price decline is weak, the shift to the alternative crop may not be attractive enough.  
The coefficients representing the lagged stock of capital take values between -1 and 0, implying that 
capital  adjusts  to  its  long-run  equilibrium  (Boetel,  et  al.,  2007).  Parameter  estimates  of  the  dummy 
variables  represent  different  Spanish  Autonomous  Communities  (mj)  and  are  not  included  here  to 













  Parameter Estimates and summary statistics (p_value between brackets)  Marginal Effects and summary statistics for 
censored equations (t-value between brackets) 
Variables  Machinery  Building and land 
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(0.86)  -  -   
2 R
  0.114  0.032  0.570  0.948  0.796 
Objective value  4.9591  Nº observation  5023 12 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Our paper focuses on assessing the impacts of PD payments on investment as well as on other production 
decisions. Since this is fundamentally an empirical question, we carry out an empirical analysis based upon a 
reduced-form application of the dual model of investment under uncertainty developed by Sckokai (2005). The 
model is estimated using farm-level data from a sample of Spanish farms specialized in COP production and 
observed during the period 2000-2004.  
Our model decision variables include investment demand, variable input use and land allocation. Since some of 
the dependent variables are censored, a system of censored and non censored equations is estimated using the 
two-step procedure proposed by  Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). PD payments are  found to increase short-run 
production  by  increasing  variable  input  use.  An  increase  in  PD  area  payments  is  also  found  to  generate  a 
statically significant increase in the investment in farm assets. In this context, the results demonstrate that this 
support scheme is found to increase long-run production. Results also show the importance of assessing the 
effects of PD payments in a dynamic framework as the one applied in this paper. 
Apart  from  PD  payments,  other  variables  are  found  to  influence  investment  decisions.  These  include  crop 
insurance contracting, tenure regime of land, farmers’ age, input and output prices, as well as risk. Moreover, PD 
payments are shown, in some cases, to be more relevant than market prices in influencing investment demand. 
This is a major contribution of our paper as previous literature using a static framework, arrived at different 
conclusions.  Specifically,  prices  were  found  to  be  more  relevant  than  payments  in  stimulating  production 
decisions (Moro and Sckokai, 1999; Oude Lansink and Peerlings, 1996; Serra, et al., 2005a and Serra et al., 
2006).  
As expected, an increase in risk has a negative impact on farm investment. Compatible with these results, crop 
insurance contracts reduce risk and thus increase investment demand. Also, increases in output prices tend to 
increase investments, while increases in input prices reduce investment demand. 
Results demonstrate that farmers’ land allocation decisions mainly depend on market prices for both inputs and 
outputs.  Also  subsidies,  labor  input  use  and  farmer  age  are  shown  to  be  important  variables  in  explaining 
production decisions. In the same context, farm wealth and rented land are revealed to be relevant factors in 
influencing farmer’s decisions. 
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